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The ability to recognize oneself in a mirror is an exceedingly rare
capacity in the animal kingdom. To date, only humans and great
apes have shown convincing evidence of mirror self-recognition.
Two dolphins were exposed to reflective surfaces, and both demonstrated responses consistent with the use of the mirror to
investigate marked parts of the body. This ability to use a mirror
to inspect parts of the body is a striking example of evolutionary
convergence with great apes and humans.

T

he capacity for mirror self-recognition (MSR) has been found
only in humans and great apes (1–8). In humans, MSR does not
emerge reliably until 18–24 months of age (9) and marks the
beginning of a developmental process of achieving increasingly
abstract psychological levels of self-awareness, including introspection and mental state attribution (10, 11). The first evidence for
MSR in a nonhuman species was experimentally demonstrated in
the common chimpanzee (1), but numerous subsequent attempts
showed no convincing evidence of self-recognition in a variety of
other primates and nonprimates, including monkeys, lesser apes,
and elephants (12–18). All of these species, including African gray
parrots (19) demonstrate the ability to use a mirror to mediate or
guide their behavior. A provocative debate continues to rage about
whether self-recognition in great apes implies that they are also
capable of more abstract levels of self-awareness (20). Therefore,
research on self-recognition in other species will have profound
implications for the idea that humans are the only species to
conceive of their own identity.
The apparent confinement of self-recognition to great apes
and humans has stimulated scientific interest in the evolutionary
significance of MSR based on common aspects of the social
ecology, cognition, and neurobiology of these species (21–25).
Dolphins have a high level of encephalization and behavioral and
cognitive complexity (26–29), but previous attempts to demonstrate MSR in dolphins have been suggestive yet inconclusive
because of difficulties in implementing adequate controls necessary to obtain robust evidence of MSR in an animal unable to
display self-recognition by touching a marked part of the body
with a hand (30, 31).
Conclusive evidence of self-recognition in a species as phylogenetically distant from primates as dolphins would play a
pivotal role in determining whether this capacity is a byproduct
of factors specific to great apes and humans or whether more
general characteristics, such as a high level of encephalization,
could help to explain the evolution of this capacity.
General Methods and Procedures
This study relies on sampling sufficient combinations of control
and test situations to produce specificity effectively equivalent to
hand use. We conducted a two-phase experiment to independently test whether two dolphins would use a mirror to view
themselves after being marked, sham-marked, or not marked
(untouched) in the presence or absence of reflective surfaces.
During Phase 1, one subject was marked and sham-marked in a
pool with walls of varying degrees of reflectivity (Fig. 1A). We
conducted separate subsequent tests on both subjects during
www.pnas.org兾cgi兾doi兾10.1073兾pnas.101086398

Phase 2 in a pool with nonreflective walls in which we affixed a
mirror in a subset of sessions (Fig. 1B).
The first and primary subject of the study was a 13-year-old
captive-born male bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus) housed
with the other subject, a 17-year-old captive-born male bottlenose
dolphin at the New York Aquarium in Brooklyn, NY. In none of
the trials in which one animal was marked was there any discernable
reaction on the part of the companion dolphin to the mark.
Furthermore, all instances of mark-directed behaviors occurred
when the companion dolphin was not near the same reflective
surface as the subject. For 4 years before, and for a period during,
the study, the two dolphins were housed for a part of each year in
a pool with three reflective glass walls. Therefore, we did not expect
our subjects to exhibit behaviors typical of animals who are initially
exposed to a mirror (31). The dolphins had prior training on
behaviors for public demonstrations but no training in relation to
reflective surfaces or on cognitive tasks.
During an experiment, the dolphin was videotaped in the
presence or absence of mirrors for 30 min before and 30 min
after a feeding context at the end of which the animal was
marked, sham-marked, or not touched at all. Both animals were
then given the standard signal releasing them from their stations.
The synchronized stepping away of the trainers from the pool’s
edge was the normal release stimulus signifying that the feed was
over. The dolphins were routinely trained to go to and stay (or
station) at a particular location in the pool, and during the
experiments, they were stationed at two separate locations for
the marking, sham-marking, or nonmarking procedures. A nontoxic temporary black ink Entré marker (Entré, Westborough,
MA) was used to mark the dolphin on different parts of its body
that were not visible to it without the use of a mirror (Fig. 2A).
Marks were either cross-hatched and triangular or circular, and
were ⬇6.4 cm in diameter (Fig. 2B). Marks were placed on
different body areas so that the subject would not habituate to
the marking location and to enable us to test whether the dolphin
would orient its body differentially to the mirror to view the
marked areas. In sham-mark sessions, the protocol was identical
to that in the actual mark sessions except that a water-filled
marker was used to control for the possibility that the animal’s
behavior was attributable to the tactile sensation of marking
rather than the mark itself. The real mark and the sham-mark
were applied to the dolphin’s skin in as close to the same manner
as possible (e.g., duration of marking, amount of pressure to skin,
and type of mark). Postfeeding mark, sham-mark, and nonmarked sessions were videotaped for 30 min in the presence or
absence of specific mirror conditions (mirror, no mirror, or
covered mirror in Phase 2 only). In Phase 2, the covered mirror
Abbreviation: MSR, mirror self-recognition.
‡D.R.
§To

and L.M. contributed equally to this work.

whom reprint requests should be addressed. E-mail: dlr28@columbia.edu.

The publication costs of this article were defrayed in part by page charge payment. This
article must therefore be hereby marked “advertisement” in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
§1734 solely to indicate this fact.

PNAS 兩 May 8, 2001 兩 vol. 98 兩 no. 10 兩 5937–5942

PSYCHOLOGY

Communicated by Donald R. Griffin, The Rockefeller University, New York, NY, February 20, 2001 (received for review October 3, 2000)

Fig. 1. (A) The pool in Phase 1. Phase 1 sessions were
conducted in a rectangular pool 13 m ⫻ 18.5 m ⫻ 3.05 m
with three reflective glass walls. During a subset of test
sessions (n ⫽ 5), a narrow Plexiglas mirror, 41.9 cm ⫻ 101.6
cm ⫻ 0.32 cm, was affixed in a vertical orientation to the
exterior of one of the reflective walls (Wall 6). The demarcated area (Wall 1) was more highly reflective than the
other glass walls because of a black surface behind it. Thus,
the Plexiglas mirror was the optimal mirror when present.
In the absence of the Plexiglas mirror, Wall 1 had the most
reflective properties. (B) The pool in Phase 2. In Phase 2, by
using the same procedures as in Phase 1, testing was
conducted in two connected pools, a large oval pool (21 m
long ⫻ 13 mm ⫻ 3.66 m deep) connected to a smaller round
pool (8.9 m in diameter ⫻ 3.05 m deep) with nonreflective
walls. During experimental sessions, the subject was stationed at the far end of the larger pool and a Plexiglas
mirror (88.9 cm ⫻ 119.4 cm ⫻ 0.32 cm) was affixed vertically
to an open gate just inside the mouth of the connected
smaller pool in 16 out of 30 sessions.

condition was achieved by turning the nonreflective mirror
backing toward the pool.
Procedures for the First Subject
Sessions conducted and taped before the feeding sessions served
as baseline control sessions in which the subject was not touched,
marked, or sham-marked. All experimental sessions were videotaped. A series of 63 15-min taped samples were prepared
from the 30 min prefeeding and postfeeding sessions, 33 in Phase
1 and 30 in Phase 2. These samples consisted of 15-min random
segments of prefeeding control sessions and the initial 15 min
immediately after the release from a feeding session after the
mark, sham-mark, or no-mark treatment.
Four observers (two experienced dolphin researchers and two
highly trained assistants) were randomly assigned to score
videotape segments. Each segment was scored by two independent raters who were blind to experimental condition and
treatment. The videotape segments began immediately after the
dolphin’s release from station after the actual mark, sham-mark,
or non-mark procedure. Marks were not visible to the raters
because of the distance and viewing angle of the video camera.
The independent observers conducted a second-by-second video
analysis and scored the duration, location, and time of occurrence of specific behaviors. Behaviors were coded as Selfdirected (mark-directed, sham-directed, or exploratory), Nondirected, Ambiguous, or Social. Mark- and sham-directed
behaviors were those in which the animal positioned himself at
5938 兩 www.pnas.org兾cgi兾doi兾10.1073兾pnas.101086398

the reflective surface and then produced orienting or repetitive
body movements so that the mark, or sham-marked area, was
visible to the animal in the reflective surface. Exploratory
behaviors are self-directed behaviors, other than mark- or
sham-directed behaviors, that occurred at the reflective surface
and included behaviors such as repetitious head circling and
close viewing of the eye or genital region reflected in the mirror.
Finally, Social behaviors were defined as those behaviors typically observed when these and other dolphins confront a familiar
or unfamiliar dolphin, including aggressive responses, e.g., jawclapping and charging, and affiliative responses, e.g., solicitous
sexual postures. Table 1 displays behavioral categories, descriptions, and examples.
Only behaviors for which there was 100% agreement between
the two raters were analyzed. A strict agreement criterion
required identical ratings on behavior, location, and timing.
There was 100% agreement for 81.1% of the behaviors in Phase
1 and for 85.1% of the behaviors (including 100% agreement on
initial behaviors at mirror) in Phase 2. The reason for the small
proportion of nonagreement was the observers’ inability to see
the subject clearly through the water.
During Phase 1, the dolphin was first exposed to shammarking and marking while in the pool with three reflective glass
walls (Fig. 1 A). In a subset of 5 out of 33 sessions, an actual
mirror was affixed to the exterior of one of the glass walls. A
corner area (Wall 1) of one of the glass walls was more highly
reflective than the other glass walls because of a black surface
Reiss and Marino

behind it. Thus, the Plexiglas mirror was the optimal reflective
surface when present. In the absence of the Plexiglas mirror,
Wall 1 had the most reflective properties.
Thirty-three sessions were conducted during Phase 1, including eight prefeeding control sessions, eight postfeeding control
sessions, one postfeeding control session with additional mirror
affixed to exterior of wall, three early sham-mark sessions, six
mark sessions, four mark sessions with additional mirror affixed
to exterior of wall, and three late sham-mark sessions. The term
‘‘early sham-mark session’’ refers to those sham-mark sessions
that occurred before the first actual marking and ‘‘late shammark session’’ refers to those sham-mark sessions that occurred
after the dolphin experienced the first real mark session. These
were distinguished from one another because the dolphin
treated the two kinds of marks differently, as described below.

Fig. 2. (A) Locations of the nontoxic, temporary mark and the number of
times the dolphins were marked in each location in mark and sham-mark
sessions. Marks were applied to either side of the body. Subject 1: b, above eye
(right, n ⫽ 1); c, above and posterior to ear (right, n ⫽ 3; left, n ⫽ 4); d, between
ear and pectoral fin (right, n ⫽ 2; left, n ⫽ 2); e, above pectoral fin (right, n ⫽
2; left, n ⫽ 1); f, posterior to pectoral fin (left, n ⫽ 1); g, below dorsal fin (right,
n ⫽ 3; left, n ⫽ 7); h, between pectoral fin (n ⫽ 2); i, umbilical (n ⫽ 1); j,
underside and tip of pectoral fin (right, n ⫽ 1). Subject 2: a, on melon (right,
n ⫽ 1; left, n ⫽ 2); e, above pectoral fin (right, n ⫽ 5; left, n ⫽ 2); g, below dorsal
fin (right, n ⫽ 2; left, n ⫽ 1; umbilical, n ⫽ 2); h, between pectoral fin (n ⫽ 1).
(B) The dolphin marked above the right eye.

Results for First Subject
The results of Phase 1 (Fig. 3A) are presented as histograms
giving the total amount of time the dolphin engaged in mark- or
sham-directed behaviors during early sham-markings, genuine
markings, and late sham-markings. The animal spent a significantly greater cumulative amount of time engaged in Selfdirected behaviors at reflective surfaces when marked than when
early sham-marked and a substantially greater cumulative
amount of time when marked than when late sham-marked. The
dolphin also spent a significantly greater cumulative amount of
time engaged in mark-directed behaviors at reflective surfaces
when marked than engaged in sham-directed behaviors when
early sham-marked (6.1% vs. 0.3% of total time, respectively)
(X2df⫽4 ⫽ 155.85, P ⬍ 0.001), and substantially more time
engaged in mark-directed behaviors when marked than when
late sham-marked (6.1% vs. 4.4% of total time, respectively).
In a total of three 15-min early sham-marking sessions conducted before the first marking session, the dolphin displayed
only one 8-sec bout (0.3% of total time for this condition) of
sham-directed behavior to a reflective surface. The data from
these early sham control trials showed that sham marking,
conducted before the dolphin actually being marked, by itself did
not elicit investigation at a reflective surface or any pattern of
behaviors that could be interpreted as Self-directed.

Behavioral category
Self-directed
Mark-directed or sham-directed

Exploratory

Non-directed
Ambiguous

Social

Reiss and Marino

Description

Example

Specific orienting or repetitive behaviors while
positioned that, when the dolphin is marked,
expose the marked body part to the reflective
surface or, when the dolphin is sham-marked,
expose the sham-marked part of the body to the
reflective surface
Specific orienting or repetitive behaviors while
positioned that occur when the dolphin is either
unmarked or marked but do not expose the
marked body part to the mirror

Repetitive upward neck stretches when the
dolphin is marked ventrally, e.g., under the chin,
or sustained left-side orientation when the
dolphin is marked behind the left pectoral fin

Does not occur while positioned at a particular
location
Positioned behavior at a reflective surface that
does not indicate a specific orientation or
exposure of one particular part of the body to
the mirror
Behaviors typically observed when subject, or other
dolphins in general, confront another unfamiliar
dolphin

Repetitive vertical head movements when the
dolphin is marked in the horizontal plane, e.g.,
behind the right pectoral fin, or sustained
right-side orientation when the dolphin is
marked on the ventral surface, e.g., near
genitals
Swimming, surfacing
Head-on position without other specific body
movements

Threats, such as squawks or jaw claps, or invitations
to interact, such as underwater tail slaps
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Table 1. Descriptions and examples of behavioral categories

In the series of late sham-markings that occurred after the first
genuine marking, the dolphin began to respond differently by
engaging in substantially more sham-directed behaviors at reflective surfaces than during the early sham-markings (4.4% vs. 0.3%,
respectively). These late sham-markings were thus differentiated
from the early sham-markings. Only after repeated exposure to
being marked did the animal begin to use the mirror to investigate
its body after being sham-marked. In the late sham-marking
sessions, the dolphin oriented to make the appropriate area visible
substantially more often than when early sham-marking had occurred. These results, therefore, suggest that, in the late shammarking trials, the dolphin used the mirror to investigate the
touched area to determine whether it was marked and, upon
discovering no mark, abandoned further self-directed behaviors.
This pattern of behavior made it difficult to interpret the subjects’
responses to late sham-markings as ‘‘true shams’’ and, as a result,
only one sham-marking was conducted in Phase 2.
Furthermore, if the dolphin was using reflective surfaces to
investigate its body, one would expect him to be more likely to
use those surfaces with the best reflective properties. In the trials
when there was no mirror present, the dolphin spent more time
engaged in mark- or sham-directed behaviors at the best reflective surface available (Wall 1 in Fig. 1 A) than at other reflective
surfaces (87.5% vs. 12.5% of total time, respectively). When the
mirror was present, the dolphin spent considerably more time
engaged in self-directed behaviors either at the mirror or at Wall
1 than at any other reflective surfaces (16.1% vs. 82.2% vs. 1.7%.
of total time, respectively).
In Phase 2, by using the Phase 1 procedures, testing was
conducted in two connected pools, a large oval pool connected
to a smaller round pool, both with nonreflective concrete walls.
Analysis was conducted by independent raters blind to condition. The distance of the above-water video camera prevented
raters from determining whether the animal was marked or not.
We conducted 30 postfeeding sessions. The dolphin was videotaped during 16 nonmarked prefeeding control sessions and
during the postfeeding sessions consisting of 8 marked condition
with the mirror sessions, 5 marked condition with a covered
mirror or no mirror sessions, 7 unmarked condition with the
mirror sessions, 9 unmarked condition with no mirror sessions,
and 1 sham-mark condition with mirror session.
We statistically tested three predictions regarding behavior
indicative of self-recognition, adopting the conservative position
that a convincing demonstration of self-recognition required all
three of these predictions be confirmed.
Prediction 1. The dolphin should display no social behavior at the

mirror. A typical response pattern in monkeys and other nonself-recognizing species to a mirror is initially social behavior,
then disinterest, followed by a reinstatement of social responses
upon relocation or reintroduction of the mirror (16). Our subject
showed no social behaviors to reflective walls or mirrors
throughout the entire test period in either pool. Although
habituated to reflective surfaces, the dolphin, unlike non-selfrecognizing species, did not show social responses to the mirrors
in either pool when they were introduced.

Fig. 3. (A) Total amount of time (sec) engaged in mark- or sham-directed
behaviors during early sham-marking, genuine markings, and late shammarking. The subject spent a significantly greater cumulative amount of time
engaged in Self-directed behaviors at reflective surfaces when marked than
when early sham-marked or late sham-marked. (B) In Phase 2, time (sec) at mirror
location under different experimental conditions: No mirror–no mark, No mirror–
mark, Mirror–no mark, and Mirror–mark. The mean time spent at the mirror
location when the subject was marked and the mirror present and uncovered was
significantly greater than under any other condition. In the one session in which
the subject was sham-marked, he spent a comparatively brief time at the mirror
location. (C) Latency from departure by the subject from stationing to the first
mirror orientation when marked, sham-marked, or unmarked. The criterion for
mirror orientation was that the dolphin came to a stop at the mirror.
5940 兩 www.pnas.org兾cgi兾doi兾10.1073兾pnas.101086398

Prediction 2. The dolphin should spend more time at the mirror

when marked than under any other conditions. This prediction
was confirmed. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that
he spent significantly more time at the mirror location when
marked than when unmarked [F(1, 26) ⫽ 11.75, P ⫽ 0.002] (Fig.
3B). The dolphin also spent more time at the mirror location
when the mirror was present and uncovered than otherwise
(covered or not present) [F(1, 26) ⫽ 88.28, P ⬍ 0.001]. The
effects of mirror presence and marking were independent based
on the absence of a significant interaction term in the ANOVA
[F(1, 26) ⫽ 1.91, P ⫽ 0.179]. Accordingly, the mean time spent
Reiss and Marino

at the mirror location when the subject was marked and the
mirror present and uncovered was significantly greater than
under any other condition. In the one trial in which the dolphin
was sham-marked, he spent a comparatively brief time at the
mirror location (Fig. 3B). This result is consistent with the
subject’s typical response to late sham-markings.
Prediction 3. The dolphin should exhibit shorter latencies in the

Procedures for Second Subject
To conduct an efficient and clear-cut assessment of whether this
capacity is replicable in a second subject, the same three
predictions for Phase 2 were made and tested on the second
animal (who was still housed in the Phase 2 pool). We used an
assessment technique whereby only the most definitive aspects of
our tests on the first subject were repeated on the second.
The dolphin was videotaped during 20 nonmarked prefeeding
control sessions and during 11 postfeeding sessions consisting of the
marked (or sham-marked) condition with the mirror, 5 marked (or
sham-marked) conditions with a covered mirror or no mirror, and
4 unmarked (or no sham-mark) conditions with the mirror. Thus,
16 mark or sham-mark sessions were conducted in this phase. Fig.
2 A displays the locations of marks on the second subject. Mark and
sham conditions, i.e., late-shams, were combined because the
second subject, like the first, was treating these conditions as
Reiss and Marino

Fig. 4. (A) Mark-directed behavior by subject to a real mirror immediately
after release from being marked. A narrow Plexiglas mirror, 41.9 cm ⫻ 101.6
cm ⫻ 0.32 cm is affixed in a vertical orientation to the exterior of one of the
reflective walls (Wall 6). During this session, the mirror was the best reflective
surface in the subject’s environment. The faint white line on the wall indicates
the location of mirror. (B) The dolphin at Wall 1, the best reflective surface in
the session, exhibiting late sham-directed behavior: a continuous and repetitive sequence of 12 dorsal-to-lateral-ventral flips exposing the location of the
sham-marked area of his body, the underside and tip of the right pectoral fin, to
the reflective surface. This unusual behavioral sequence continued for 32 sec.

equivalent in this setting. Randomized videotaped segments were
scored by two independent raters blind to experimental condition
and treatment. They conducted a second-by-second video analysis
and scored the duration, location, and time of occurrence of specific
behaviors exhibited by the dolphin during the initial 10-sec period
at the mirror after the release signal. Only the initial 10-sec period
of mirror orientation by the dolphin was used for testing predictions
2 and 3 in the second subject because we found this to be the most
diagnostic time period for analysis with the first subject. No social
behaviors were exhibited by the dolphin for the remainder of time
spent at the mirror during these sessions. As with the first subject,
only behaviors for which there was 100% agreement between the
two raters were included in the analyses. For this analysis, there was
100% agreement on all of the behaviors that occurred in the first
10 sec.
Results for Second Subject
We tested the same three predictions from Phase 2 testing of the
first subject, again adopting the stance that if any of these
predictions were falsified, we would conclude that we did not
demonstrate self-recognition in the subject.
Prediction 1. For this analysis, the entire videotaped segments

were reviewed, but no social behaviors at the mirror occurred
during these segments or when the mirror was reintroduced into
the pool after being absent for some time.
PNAS 兩 May 8, 2001 兩 vol. 98 兩 no. 10 兩 5941
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temporal interval from the release signal from its stationed position
to mirror use after being marked or sham-marked than after
sessions when not handled. That is, if the dolphin was using the
mirror to view the marked parts of its body after being marked or
sham-marked, upon release he should swim to the mirror earlier
than when not marked. Furthermore, the first behavior exhibited at
the mirror under the marked or late sham condition should be more
likely to be one that exposes a marked (or sham-marked) part of the
body to the mirror surface. This was a risky prediction because if the
subject were capable of self-recognition but was not more motivated
(an important factor in mark-tests) to view itself when marked than
when unmarked, this prediction would be disconfirmed. Latency
data were transformed to their common logarithms after adding a
constant value of 20 to eliminate negative values. Negative values
occurred because in half of the sessions in the mark or sham-mark
condition, the dolphin departed from the station before the release
time began. A t test showed that the mean latency to the mirror from
release was significantly lower when the dolphin was marked (or
sham-marked) than when he was unmarked (t ⫽ 2.7df⫽14, P ⫽ 0.017)
(Fig. 3C). Moreover, the subject’s initial behavior was oriented to
the mark as opposed to other body areas in six out of eight mark
sessions (P ⬍ 0.05 using a binomial test). In the remaining two mark
sessions, the dolphin’s behavior was ambiguous. Therefore, when
the animal was marked or late sham-marked, he quickly swam to the
mirror upon release (and in some cases before the release signal)
and immediately exposed the marked (or sham-marked) part of his
body to the mirror (Fig. 4A and see Movies 1 and 2, which are
published as supplemental data on the PNAS web site, www.
pnas.org).
Moreover, numerous qualitative observations corroborate our
more formal quantitative analyses. For example, a striking
example occurred after a late sham-marking to the dolphin’s
right pectoral fin. He exhibited a continuous sequence of 12
dorsal-to-ventral body flips in front of Wall 1 that brought the
right pectoral fin into close viewing range at this highly reflective
surface (Fig. 4B and see Movie 3, which is published as supplemental data on the PNAS web site). Another notable example
occurred during a series of additional sessions that were conducted after the formal experimental sessions included in the
data set were completed. The dolphin, upon being marked for
the first and only time on the tongue, immediately swam to the
Plexiglas mirror and engaged in a mouth opening and closing
sequence never before observed by him during the study.

Prediction 2. This prediction was confirmed. An ANOVA of the

time spent at the mirror locations showed that the dolphin spent
significantly more time at the mirror location when marked than
when unmarked [F(1, 15) ⫽ 9.38, P ⫽ 0.008] and spent more time
at the mirror location when the mirror was uncovered than when
covered [F(1, 15) ⫽ 15.26, P ⫽ 0.001]. Therefore, the mean time
spent at the mirror location when the animal was marked and the
mirror present and uncovered was significantly greater than
under any other condition.
Prediction 3. Latency data were transformed as with the first
subject to account for negative values, which occurred in four out
of nine of the sessions in the mark or sham condition because the
dolphin departed from the station before the release time began.
A t test showed that the mean latency to the mirror from release
was significantly lower when the dolphin was marked (or shammarked) than when he was unmarked (t ⫽ 2.6df⫽10, P ⫽ 0.028).
Moreover, the animal’s initial behavior was oriented to the mark
or sham-mark as opposed to other body areas in 9 out of 11 mark
or sham-mark sessions (P ⬍ 0.05 binomial test) and, of the actual
mark sessions, the initial behavior was mark-oriented in all 9
sessions. Therefore, when the dolphin was marked or late
sham-marked, he quickly swam to the mirror upon release (and
in some cases before the release signal) and immediately exposed
the marked (or sham-marked) part of its body to the mirror.

General Discussion
Collectively, these findings provide definitive evidence that the
two dolphins in this study used the mirror (and other reflective
surfaces) to investigate parts of their bodies that were marked.
These findings, therefore, offer the first convincing evidence that
a nonprimate species, the bottlenose dolphin, is capable of MSR.
Our study revealed interesting similarities and differences between the way dolphins and chimpanzees respond to mirrors and
body marks. Chimpanzees have been reported to habituate rapidly
to body marks in the context of mark tests (2). Likewise, although
our subjects displayed clear self-orienting mark-directed behavior
after being marked or after late-sham marking, neither one maintained a continuous orientation to the mirror throughout the entire
session. This may indicate habituation to the mark after inspection
of it. Also, unlike chimpanzees, dolphins do not attend to marks on
companions. Dolphins may pay less attention to marks on the
bodies of companions because, unlike primates, they do not groom
1. Gallup, G. G. (1970) Science 167, 86–87.
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each other. This difference makes our findings even more interesting because dolphins clearly are interested in marks on their own
body despite the fact that they do not have a natural tendency
toward social grooming.
Bottlenose dolphins share several behavioral and social ecological features with great apes and humans, including sophisticated memory and classification of relationships among events
(27), the ability to learn rudimentary symbol-based artificial
codes (27, 32), and complex social behavior (28). Bottlenose
dolphins, great apes, and humans all possess high degrees of
encephalization and neocortical expansion (26, 33, 34). Yet the
brains of dolphins are markedly different from those of primates
on many levels, including cortical cytoarchitecture and organization (33, 34), reflecting the fact that the cetacean (dolphin,
whale, and porpoise) and primate ancestral lines diverged at least
65–70 million years ago. The present findings imply that the
emergence of self-recognition is not a byproduct of factors
specific to great apes and humans but instead may be attributable
to more general characteristics such as a high degree of encephalization and cognitive ability. Hypotheses about the evolution of
self-recognition have, to date, focused on primate characteristics. Our findings show that self-recognition may be based on a
different neurological substrate in dolphins.
More generally, these results represent a striking case of
cognitive convergence in the face of profound differences in
neuroanatomical characteristics and evolutionary history. The
question of whether dolphins are capable of more complex forms
of self-awareness, such as introspection and mental state attribution, remains unanswered. The present findings should motivate further investigation of other indicators of self-awareness.
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